1vulnerability
- Critical0 (0.0%)
- High1 (100.0%)
- Medium0 (0.0%)
- Moderate0 (0.0%)
- Low0 (0.0%)
grackle-ai-runtime-sdk
Ecosystem: npm
Downloads:
- 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
- 1HighAffects 1 version
- 0MediumAffects 0 versions
- 0ModerateAffects 0 versions
- 0LowAffects 0 versions
Monthly breakdown
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 1
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 0
- Low: 0
Vulnerabilities (1)
Known vulnerabilities affecting grackle-ai-runtime-sdk, based on data from OSV.
| ID | Severity | Summary | Affected versions | Published | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g | High | Grackle has command/argument injection in the git worktree executor that enables RCE on provisioned hosts via an unsanitized task branch name (shell:true)## Summary The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns `git` through a shell, and the untrusted task **branch** name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine `SpawnSession` RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve **arbitrary command execution** as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox. This advisory bundles two related defects in `worktree.ts` (audit findings **F1** and * |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) |
- GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6gHighGrackle has command/argument injection in the git worktree executor that enables RCE on provisioned hosts via an unsanitized task branch name (shell:true)
<= 0.132.1
## Summary The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns `git` through a shell, and the untrusted task **branch** name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine `SpawnSession` RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve **arbitrary command execution** as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox. This advisory bundles two related defects in `worktree.ts` (audit findings **F1** and *