effect-platform

Ecosystem: npm

Downloads:

Vulnerabilities from the last (months)
  • 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
  • 0HighAffects 0 versions
  • 0MediumAffects 0 versions
  • 1ModerateAffects 1 version
  • 0LowAffects 0 versions
Severity distribution (all time)
1vulnerability
  • Critical0 (0.0%)
  • High0 (0.0%)
  • Medium0 (0.0%)
  • Moderate1 (100.0%)
  • Low0 (0.0%)

Monthly breakdown

  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 0
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 1
    • Low: 0

Vulnerabilities (1)

Known vulnerabilities affecting effect-platform, based on data from OSV.

Vulnerabilities affecting effect-platform
IDSeveritySummaryAffected versionsPublishedSource
GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfrModerateEffect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()### Impact The `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header. For example, a `domain` of `"legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld"` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None
  • >= 0.1.0, < 0.97.1
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
  • GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfrModerate
    Effect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()
    • >= 0.1.0, < 0.97.1

    ### Impact The `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header. For example, a `domain` of `"legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld"` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None

    CVE: CVE-2026-115779

Showing 1-1 of 1 vulnerabilities