cardano402-mcp-server

Ecosystem: npm

Downloads:

Vulnerabilities from the last (months)
  • 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
  • 0HighAffects 0 versions
  • 0MediumAffects 0 versions
  • 0ModerateAffects 0 versions
  • 1LowAffects 1 version
Severity distribution (all time)
1vulnerability
  • Critical0 (0.0%)
  • High0 (0.0%)
  • Medium0 (0.0%)
  • Moderate0 (0.0%)
  • Low1 (100.0%)

Monthly breakdown

  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 0
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 0
    • Low: 1

Vulnerabilities (1)

Known vulnerabilities affecting cardano402-mcp-server, based on data from OSV.

Vulnerabilities affecting cardano402-mcp-server
IDSeveritySummaryAffected versionsPublishedSource
GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446Low@cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url## Summary `@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `<= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an ## Impact ### 1. No spending limits on signed payments An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypass
  • < 0.1.2
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
  • GHSA-rp72-5v5q-2446Low
    @cardano402/mcp-server missing spending limits, LAN-exposed HTTP transport, and SSRF via catalog.server.url
    • < 0.1.2

    ## Summary `@cardano402/mcp-server` versions `<= 0.1.1` ship three security gaps that can lead to unauthorized fund movement when the package is used as designed (an MCP server exposing Cardano payment tools to an ## Impact ### 1. No spending limits on signed payments An LLM (or prompt-injected LLM) calling tools registered by the MCP server can invoke them in a loop. Each call signs a real Cardano transaction for the catalog-advertised amount. There is no per-call cap, daily ceiling, MCP elicitation/confirmation step, or recipient allowlist. The `MAINNET=true` env-var guardrail can be bypass

Showing 1-1 of 1 vulnerabilities