agenticmail-api

Ecosystem: npm

Downloads:

Vulnerabilities from the last (months)
  • 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
  • 2HighAffects 2 versions
  • 0MediumAffects 0 versions
  • 0ModerateAffects 0 versions
  • 0LowAffects 0 versions
Severity distribution (all time)
2vulnerabilities
  • Critical0 (0.0%)
  • High2 (100.0%)
  • Medium0 (0.0%)
  • Moderate0 (0.0%)
  • Low0 (0.0%)

Monthly breakdown

  • Critical
  • High
  • Medium
  • Moderate
  • Low
  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 0
    • Low: 0
  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 0
    • Low: 0

Vulnerabilities (2)

Known vulnerabilities affecting agenticmail-api, based on data from OSV.

Vulnerabilities affecting agenticmail-api
IDSeveritySummaryAffected versionsPublishedSource
GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pmHighAgenticMail: Cross-agent task authorization bypass in AgenticMail API## Summary A low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accoun
  • < 0.9.64
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-wjjv-3mj2-39hfHighAgenticMail API/storage and outbound relay hardening fixesThe current upstream main branch at commit 7e0206d was reviewed, and the fix-first patch set was rebased on 2026-05-18. The patches cover: validated and bound inactive-agent hour filtering; storage SQL identifier validation; metadata-backed ownership checks for raw storage SQL; blocking direct storage metadata access through raw SQL; fail-closed outbound worker secret handling; SMTP envelope/header control-character validation before command construction; and TLS certificate verification as the default for MailSender with an explicit opt-out for local development. Validation completed locally
  • < 0.9.32
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
  • GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pmHigh
    AgenticMail: Cross-agent task authorization bypass in AgenticMail API
    • < 0.9.64

    ## Summary A low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accoun

    CVE: CVE-2026-57494

  • GHSA-wjjv-3mj2-39hfHigh
    AgenticMail API/storage and outbound relay hardening fixes
    • < 0.9.32

    The current upstream main branch at commit 7e0206d was reviewed, and the fix-first patch set was rebased on 2026-05-18. The patches cover: validated and bound inactive-agent hour filtering; storage SQL identifier validation; metadata-backed ownership checks for raw storage SQL; blocking direct storage metadata access through raw SQL; fail-closed outbound worker secret handling; SMTP envelope/header control-character validation before command construction; and TLS certificate verification as the default for MailSender with an explicit opt-out for local development. Validation completed locally

    CVE: CVE-2026-47255

Showing 1-2 of 2 vulnerabilities