2vulnerabilities
- Critical0 (0.0%)
- High2 (100.0%)
- Medium0 (0.0%)
- Moderate0 (0.0%)
- Low0 (0.0%)
ag-psd
Ecosystem: npm
Downloads:
- 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
- 2HighAffects 2 versions
- 0MediumAffects 0 versions
- 0ModerateAffects 0 versions
- 0LowAffects 0 versions
Monthly breakdown
- 2 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 2
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 0
- Low: 0
Vulnerabilities (2)
Known vulnerabilities affecting ag-psd, based on data from OSV.
| ID | Severity | Summary | Affected versions | Published | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-qfx6-q44v-9qqw | High | ag-psd can exhaust memory when parsing crafted PSD dimensions### Summary readPsd() commits the image/layer buffers from the declared header geometry (width x height x channels x depth, and per-layer rectangles) before validating those values against the actual data. A tiny crafted PSD declaring huge geometry forces a multi-gigabyte allocation. ### Impact On ag-psd 30.2.0, Node 24, a 52-byte PSD makes readPsd(buf) commit ~3.17 GB (measured peak RSS) in ~0.45 s before throwing a catchable RangeError ("Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView") — about 61,000,000x amplification. Because the buffer is committed before validation, the allocation OOM-kil |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) | |
| GHSA-6w3r-6hpr-hp6p | High | ag-psd: Uncontrolled Memory Allocation in PSD Layer Decoding (totalMemoryLimit bypass)### Summary The `readPsd()` function in `ag-psd` accepts a `totalMemoryLimit` option to cap memory usage when parsing untrusted PSD files, but this limit is never forwarded to the layer image buffer allocation path. A property name mismatch (`totalMemoryLimit` vs. `memoryLimit`) causes the size guard inside `createImageDataBitDepth` to be skipped unconditionally. An attacker who can supply a crafted PSD to any application using `ag-psd` for server-side parsing can force an unbounded heap allocation — a 5000×5000 layer in a 86-byte file allocates 200 MB — leading to denial of service through pr |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) |
- GHSA-qfx6-q44v-9qqwHighag-psd can exhaust memory when parsing crafted PSD dimensions
< 31.0.0
### Summary readPsd() commits the image/layer buffers from the declared header geometry (width x height x channels x depth, and per-layer rectangles) before validating those values against the actual data. A tiny crafted PSD declaring huge geometry forces a multi-gigabyte allocation. ### Impact On ag-psd 30.2.0, Node 24, a 52-byte PSD makes readPsd(buf) commit ~3.17 GB (measured peak RSS) in ~0.45 s before throwing a catchable RangeError ("Offset is outside the bounds of the DataView") — about 61,000,000x amplification. Because the buffer is committed before validation, the allocation OOM-kil
CVE: CVE-2026-62297
- GHSA-6w3r-6hpr-hp6pHighag-psd: Uncontrolled Memory Allocation in PSD Layer Decoding (totalMemoryLimit bypass)
< 31.0.1
### Summary The `readPsd()` function in `ag-psd` accepts a `totalMemoryLimit` option to cap memory usage when parsing untrusted PSD files, but this limit is never forwarded to the layer image buffer allocation path. A property name mismatch (`totalMemoryLimit` vs. `memoryLimit`) causes the size guard inside `createImageDataBitDepth` to be skipped unconditionally. An attacker who can supply a crafted PSD to any application using `ag-psd` for server-side parsing can force an unbounded heap allocation — a 5000×5000 layer in a 86-byte file allocates 200 MB — leading to denial of service through pr
CVE: CVE-2026-63501